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Abstract—We study the problem of efficiently disseminating
authenticated blockchain information from blockchain nodes
(servers) to Internet of Things (IoT) devices, through a wire-
less base station (BS). In existing blockchain protocols, upon
generation of a new block, each IoT device receives a copy of
the block header, authenticated via digital signature by one or
more trusted servers. Since it relies on unicast transmissions, the
required communication resources grow linearly with the number
of IoT devices. We propose a more efficient scheme, in which a
single copy of each block header is multicasted, together with the
signatures of servers. In addition, if IoT devices tolerate a delay,
we exploit the blockchain structure to amortize the authentication
in time, by transmitting only a subset of signature in each
block period. Finally, the BS sends redundant information, via
a repetition code, to deal with the unreliable wireless channel,
with the aim of decreasing the amount of feedback required from
IoT devices. Our analysis shows the trade-off between timely
authentication of blocks and reliability of the communication,
depending on the packet loss rate offered by the channel. The
numerical results show that the performance benefits of the
proposed scheme makes it a viable starting point for designing
new lightweight protocols for blockchains.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in un-
derstanding the potential applications of blockchains to the
Internet of Things (IoT) landscape [1]. However, the literature
on the integration of the blockchain protocols with the wireless
networks is still scarce [2]. In this respect, discovering the
trade-offs and potential bottlenecks of blockchain protocols
plays a pivotal role in the context of IoT systems, in which
devices typically have constrained energy resources and are
connected by low-cost wireless networks, e.g. Wi-Fi, Blue-
tooth, or LoRaWAN [3].
In this work, we investigate the communication cost in-
curred by a wireless base station (BS) for sending blockchain
information to IoT devices. In legacy blockchain synchroniza-
tion schemes, a device, connected to the blockchain network
via the BS, receives an update whenever a new block is
generated by the blockchain network. Clearly, such schemes
do not scale well when the number of devices connected to
the same BS grows, leading potentially to a communication
bottleneck. A related problem is that the legacy schemes use
reliable transport layer (e.g. TCP), which involves a significant
signalling overhead and is thus unsuitable for low-energy IoT
devices.
Our proposal is based on the key observation that if devices
are connected to the same blockchain network, they are highly
likely to be interested in receiving the same information,
namely the same blocks or, in case of lightweight clients [4],
just the block headers. The only difference among the devices
is the set of servers that each device trusts. Hence, the block
should be authenticated by several servers in such a way that
each node trusts at least one of the authentication servers.1
The servers of the blockchain network provide authentication
of blocks by sending to devices a digital signature that signs
the block. Therefore, in our proposal the end-to-end channel
from blockchain nodes to IoT devices is authentic but not
confidential. Still, a confidential channel can be set up when
a device needs to exchange additional information through
transactions.
By leveraging the broadcast nature of the wireless medium,
we design a scheme in which the BS multicasts blocks to all
devices, together with a set of server signatures. Reliable trans-
mission is, in general, provided by forward error correction
(FEC). In this work we attain reliability in the simplest form of
FEC, which is a mere repetition of the blocks. The signatures
are not repeated, since we rely on the signature amortization
property that is inherent to the blockchain protocols and allows
a device to authenticate all previously chained blocks by
receiving a single signature. Depending on the progress of the
reception of blocks and signatures, several cases may arise,
as illustrated in the examples in Fig. 1, in which there is a
server and three clients, which are initially synchronized. The
server first multicasts a block to the clients, but none of the
clients receive the signature, see Fig. 1(a). Consequently, since
the clients cannot verify the block, they are now delayed by
one block, see Fig. 1(b). The server then sends a third block
to the three clients. The first client receives the block without
signature, increasing its authentication delay to two blocks, see
Fig. 1(c). For the second client, both the third block and its
signature are received, making the second block authenticated
as well, thanks to the chaining. The third client only receives
the signature of the third block. In this case, the number
of non-authenticated blocks is also two, as the signature of
the third block can not be chained because signatures are
chained through blocks. Hence, the use of amortized signatures
mitigates the effect of packet loss. As soon as the blocks are
chained, the client can authenticate its copy of the blockchain
using only a subset of the signatures.
1The servers authenticate the data packet carrying the block and should not
be confused with the blockchain validators, which sign the block.
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Fig. 1. Representations of authenticated blockchain for three alternative cases (a) before and (b)-(c) after the transmission of two authenticated blocks.
Through analysis of the scheme, we show that the BS can
trade-off the timely authentication of block streams, and their
reliable transmission, by selecting the length of the code, i.e.
repetitions of the blocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II provides a brief introduction to blockchain and to re-
lated works. Section III presents the system model. Section IV
elaborates the proposed scheme, while Section V is devoted to
its analysis. Section VI presents the evaluation and Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Blockchains
In a blockchain network, a (possibly large) set of nodes store
a copy of a same ledger. The ledger records the modifications
to the state of a system, e.g. a financial accounting [5]. The
modifications are batched into information blocks, which also
include a header that contains metadata. The initial state is
described in a block called genesis, see Fig. 2. Upon each
modification of the state, a new block is propagated through
the network, becomes locally validated by the nodes, and, if
valid, is appended to each nodes’ local copy of the ledger.
Each block contains in their header the hash value of the
previous block header, which enforces an order and ensures
uniqueness of the ledger, see Fig. 2. To avoid uncontrolled
generation of blocks, nodes can only propagate blocks that
fulfil certain consensus rules, e.g. proof-of-work [5]. This
provides consistency of the ledgers, without a centralized
trusted authority.
The propagation delays in the network might cause forks,
i.e. presence of conflicting, valid chains of blocks [6]. The
forks are resolved by voting on which of the co-existing chains
should be considered valid [5]. After the resolution of a fork,
the block that remains without children, see Fig. 2, termed
orphan in Bitcoin, is deleted from memory. In principle, a fork
can last many blocks, however regular blockchain networks are
well connected to avoid generating consecutive orphan blocks.
As the validation of blocks is an expensive process in
terms of memory and computing resources, lightweight clients
typically request only the block header, instead of the entire
block, delegating the verification to trusted nodes. In addition,
they may request part of the ledger that they are interested in
observing [4], [7]. Since this entails full trust in the nodes,
in order to detect misbehaving ones, a lightweight client can
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Fig. 2. Representations of blockchain. ‘h’ indicates the hash value of the
previous block.
request the information from a set of nodes, and verify that the
received block headers are consistent.2 The model described
in the following text focuses on lightweight clients, which
represent typical IoT devices.
B. Related work
The problem of reliable and authenticated multicasting of
data streams is a well-investigated subject [9]. Here, a message
is authenticated when it is digitally signed by a trusted party
and the signature is received. However, message and signature
are not necessarily sent together. Hence, when a message is
received, but not authenticated, it is considered useless.
In systems where authentication delay is tolerated, amor-
tized signatures, based on cryptographic hash functions [10],
can be used to reduce the communication cost [11]. The idea
is to include in each message the hash value of the previous
message, thus chaining them in a sequence. In this way, the
reception of a valid signature for a message makes the previous
messages authenticated as well. This feature, illustrated in
Fig. 1, is already embedded in the blockchain by design,
thanks to the block chaining.
When a delay is not acceptable, the signatures of different
parties can be combined to a shorter one, generated by aggre-
gate signature schemes [12]. When the aggregate signature is
valid, it means that all servers authenticated it. However, the
signature verification algorithm has a high computational cost
and requires the storage of the public keys of all signers [12].
For this reason, this solution is not suitable for the IoT system
that we consider.
Finally, in the context of wireless multicasting of data
streams, FEC techniques are used to limit the feedback from
receivers, in case of packet loss [9].
2Alternatively, they can implement incentive-based protocols, e.g. see [8],
which are not treated in this paper.
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Fig. 4. The synchronization process as seen by three clients. The colored
blocks are received and authenticated, the empty ones are received by not
authenticated.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a set of V servers and a set of U clients, and a
BS, as depicted in Fig. 3. The servers are observing the updates
to the state of a blockchain, by receiving new blocks from the
blockchain network. The block generation process is assumed
to be stationary and each new block defines a new period.
Every time the servers receive a valid block, they extract the
block header, sign it, and send it to the BS reliably and with a
negligible delay. The block header is signed using public-key
cryptography. To simplify the nomenclature and with a slight
abuse of terminology, hereafter we shall refer to the block
header as block; we also note that the presented analysis is
independent from the amount of information in the blocks.
Assuming that all servers are reliable, in block period
t = 1, 2, . . ., the BS receives V copies of the block and V
signatures (a pair from each server). The BS verifies all of
them, discarding invalid blocks.
The clients are connected to the BS via wireless links, see
the right part of Fig. 3. The length of the packet containing
a block and a signature packet is lb and ls bits, respectively.
We assume that modulation and rate of the BS transmission
are fixed and the bit error probability is Pbit for the downlink
channels of all clients. Thus, the probability of not receiving
a block or signature is given by pe,b = 1 − (1 − Pbit)lb and
pe,s = 1− (1− Pbit)ls , respectively.
A client u ∈ 1, . . . , U trusts a subset of the servers, for
which it knows the public keys. Each client informs the BS
of the ID of one of the trusted server during the initialization
phase. When a valid signature is received from the trusted
subset of servers, the corresponding block is considered valid,
as well as all previously chained blocks. The client stores
the valid blocks and signatures, as shown in Fig. 4. To avoid
sending to the IoT devices information that is forked out from
the blockchain, servers apply a delay before sending blocks to
the BS. The delay, same for all servers, is chosen larger than
the maximum duration of a fork. Accordingly, IoT devices
never observe the event of fork, which is always resolved on
the server side, at the expense of additional information delay.
We denote by h the number of blocks in the blockchain.
Further, we denote by dru the difference between h and the
last block that u received and that is chained with the genesis
block, and by dau the difference between h and the last block
chained with the genesis block for which u received a valid
signature. Note that dau ≥ dru. In the example of Fig. 4, dr1 = 0,
da1 = 1, d
r
2 = d
a
2 = 4, d
r
3 = d
a
3 = 5. The maximum tolerated
authentication delay, same for all devices, is d block periods.
d does not include the delay introduced by servers.
The uplink (UL) channel is assumed reliable within the
duration of the block period (that typically lasts several sec-
onds). The UL serves as signal to the BS that the blocks have
been received, and to request specific information of interest
included in the blockchain state (e.g. “transactions” or their
“receipts” [13]). However, the latter feature is not analyzed in
this work.
IV. REPEAT-AUTHENTICATE SCHEME
In the proposed scheme, the BS transmits multicast packets
containing either a block or a signature, using fixed rate and
power. Clients tolerate a delay, hence the BS does not transmit
all signatures in all block periods. Instead, in a generic block
period the BS sends the most recent k blocks3 and s signatures
that authenticate the last block among these k, see Fig. 5.
In each block period, the s signatures to be sent are chosen
uniformly at random out of the available V server signatures;
this ensures that on average the same number of signatures are
transmitted for each server. Each client can possibly receive
more trusted signatures per block period by trusting more
servers, but the BS is not informed about this.
We assume that k, i.e., the number of packets containing
blocks in each period, is fixed. Moreover, the channel re-
sources allocated for the multicast transmissions are fixed to
b bits in each block period. The available resources permit to
send
s =
⌊
b− k lb
ls
⌋
(1)
signatures in a period, where lb and ls are the lengths of a
block and a signature, respectively. It is necessary that b is
large enough to allow s > 1 such that the data stream is
authenticated.
The feedback from a client u to the BS consists of a single
bit and is transmitted only when dau > d, where the maximum
tolerated authentication delay d is a design parameter. The
purpose of the feedback is to trigger a unicast transmission of
the last d blocks from the BS to u, together with a signature
to authenticate all of them, so that u can re-synchronize. In
case of such event, the BS has to allocate extra resources
in addition to the b bits, used for multicasting. According to
3This forms a repetition code, which represents the simplest instance of
packet-level FEC. Future works may introduce more complex coding schemes.
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Fig. 7. Example of the process, in which d = 4 and k = 3. At t = 0
the client checks if block generated at t = −4 is completed. A block and a
signature generated at j are indicated as b−j and s−j , respectively.
this mechanism, the BS receives between 0 and U feedback
packets in a block period, depending on the synchronization
state of the devices. In the example in Fig. 4, client u = 3
sends the UL packet because d = 4 and da3 = 5. Note that d
also provides a upper bound to the value of k, as k ≤ d.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze how to select the parameter k
depending on the QoS (Φ) to be offered. The QoS is defined
as the long-term average number of clients delayed beyond
the deadline d (that is, the number of re-synchronizations
triggered):
Φ = lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
τ=0
U∑
u=0
1{du(τ) > d}. (2)
Ideally Φ is zero, because there are no delayed clients.
At each period t, a client u ∈ 1, . . . , U checks if the block
generated d periods before (i.e. at t − d) has been received
and authenticated, see Fig. 7. Recall that block generated at
t−d can be authenticated in two ways: a packet containing its
signature is received at t−d; or a packet containing a signature
is received at tj , t− d < tj ≤ t and all blocks between t− d
and tj have been received. This permits to authenticate the
blocks at t − d by leveraging the ledger chain structure. It
follows that it is unnecessary to observe the synchronization
process at each period, but only when the client may possibly
fail. For instance, if the most recent block (generated at t) is
chained and authenticated, the client will surely not fail within
the next d periods.
Based on this key consideration, we introduce the variable
x(t) ∈ {0, . . . , d} that is used to track the authentication
state the client. When the client may request a unicast re-
synchronization, the state is x(t) = 1. From here, if the
block t− d is not authenticated, the client transitions to state
x(t+ 1) = 0, corresponding to the unicast re-synchronization,
at which the last d+1 authenticated blocks are sent. After the
client has been re-synchronized, it cannot request a unicast re-
synchronization for the next d periods, and hence it spends d
periods in state 0 before going back to state x(t+d+ 1) = 1.
On the other hand, if in state x(t) = 1 the block t − d has
been authenticated by a signature received at t− d+ j, where
0 ≤ j ≤ d − 1, the client does not fail. In our process, it
corresponds to a transition from x(t) = 1 to x(t+ 1) = j+ 1.
The sojourn time in x(t+ 1) = j is j, because the successive
j − 1 blocks are authenticated as well. From here, the client
always returns to x(t + j − 1) = 1. A possible interpretation
of x(t) is that it tracks the oldest chained signature found
between t− d and t. For instance, if a client always receives
a chained signature in each period, it would stay in state
x(t) = 1 ∀t. If it never receives trusted multicast signatures,
it only receives unicast re-synchronizations, looping between
x = 0 and x = 1. Finally, if the channel is reliable and the
client receives a trusted signature every d periods, it loops
between states x = 1 and x = d. In the following text we
find the expressions for the transition probabilities p1,j for
0 ≤ j ≤ d.
The probability that block at t−d is signed and received is
p1,1 = ps
(
1− pke,b
)
, (3)
where ps is the probability of receiving the packet (from at
least one of the trusted servers) with a signature of the block
and pke,b the probability of not receiving a packet containing
the block in any of the k transmission attempts. To find ps, we
indicate the number of servers trusted by client u ∈ 1, . . . , U
as Vu, 0 < Vu ≤ V . Hence, the probability that it receives at
least one signature from a trusted server, in a period, depends
on both the packet loss and the probability that the signature
of a specific server is sent:
ps =
min(Vu,s)∑
j=1
Pr[any of j rx | j sent ] Pr [j sent] (4)
=
min(Vu,s)∑
j=1
(1− pje,s)
(
Vu
j
)(
V−Vu
s−j
)(
V
s
) .
Here,
(
Vu
j
)
are the number of combinations for which
j signatures, out of the Vu available from trusted servers,
are selected to be multicasted;
(
V−Vu
s−j
)
are the number of
combinations of the signatures from untrusted servers (there
are V − Vu), of which s − j are transmitted. Finally, there
are
(
V
s
)
combinations of s signatures that can be transmitted
among the V available at the BS.
Even if the block at t − d is not signed, it may be
authenticated by a block completed between t−d and t, if they
are chained. The probability that block at t−d is received and
not signed, but authenticated by the j-th successive block is
found as follows. Since the first (chained) signature is received
after j, we must take into account that j−1 blocks are received
but not signed; we also take into account that the most recent
k−1 blocks (those for which d−k+1 < j ≤ d) are transmitted
less than k times. The observations lead to the expression:
p1,j =

ps(1− ps)j−1(1− pke,b)j , if 1 ≤ j ≤ d− k + 1
ps(1− ps)j−1(1− pke,b)d−k+1∏j
i=d−k+2(1− pd−i+1e,b ), if d− k + 1 < j ≤ d.
(5)
The derivation is given in Appendix A. Note the similarity with
a geometric distribution, that is “weighted” by the probability
of chaining j blocks. The probability of failure is found as:
p1,0 = 1−
d∑
j=1
p1,j , (6)
and pj,1 = 1, ∀j 6= 1 directly follows from the definition of
the process.
This concludes the characterization of the transition proba-
bilities of the process of Fig. 6. We can simplify the Markov
chain of Fig. 6 by grouping all states j > 1 into a state
G. The new chain has three states {0, 1, G} with transition
probabilities:
P =
 0 p0,1 0p1,0 p1,1 ∑dj=2 p1,j
0 1 0
 (7)
and stationary probabilities equal to:
pi =
(
p1,0 1
∑d
j=2 p1,j
)
. (8)
The average number of periods spent in states 0, 1 and G are
S0 = d, S1 = 1 and SG =
∑d
j=2 j, respectively. We find the
average time spent in state 1 as:
T =
S1∑
i∈{0,1,G} Sipij
(9)
=
1
d · p1,0 + 1 · p1,1 +
∑d
j=2 j · p1,j
. (10)
Then, the average number of clients that can potentially fail
in a period is U ·pi1, since they follow independent processes.
Among them, the average number of clients that actually fail
in a period is:
Φ = U · T · p1,0. (11)
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Fig. 8. Numerical (nu.) and analytical (an.) values of Φ for different bit error
rates (Pbit), repetitions (k), and number of clients (V ).
VI. RESULTS
The numerical results are obtained considering block header
size of lb = 640 bits (the size of a block header in Bitcoin) and
signature size of ls = 512 bits. The BS allocates b = 8000 bits
per block period for the multicasting. The maximum tolerated
delay is d = 10 blocks.4
First, we study the performance of the scheme, in terms of
the the average number of failures, Φ, see Fig. 8, for which
we set U = V and assume that each client trusts a different
server. The figure shows a good match between the numerical
and analytical values. It can be observed that Φ increases with
the bit error probability, Pbit, and with the number of servers,
as expected. In the cases when k is 2 and 5, the number of
signatures sent in a period are s = 13 and s = 9, respectively.
It is worth to note that, if Pbit is low, it is better to reduce
the number of repetitions, k, in order to accommodate more
signatures. However, above a certain threshold value of Pbit,
the decision is inverted.
The model also captures the impact of different number of
trusted servers per client. Fig. 9 reports the average number of
failures per block Φ as function of repetitions k and number
of servers trusted by each client. The bit error probability is
fixed to Pbit = 4 × 10−4. In Fig. 9(a), each client trusts one
server. It results that a low number of repetitions are sufficient
to increase the reliability. In effect, increasing k reduces the
number of signatures per period (see (1)), then the information
is received but not authenticated. Fig. 9(b), shows that when
a client trusts five (randomly selected) servers, i.e. Vu = 5,
the value of Φ is drastically decreased, as it disposes of much
frequent authentication. In both graphs, the value of Φ is only
defined in the points where V/s > d, that is the condition for
which the signature of each server is sent at least once every
d periods (on average).
4In blockchain applications, it is common to wait several periods, ranging
from six in Bitcoin [5] to tens in other blockchain systems [14], before trusting
that the block will not be forked out.
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Fig. 9. The average number of failures per block (Φ) for various number of
repetitions (k), when each client trusts (a) one server and (b) five servers.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced the concept of separation of common
information, i.e. block headers, and information of interest
for single IoT devices, for lightweight blockchain protocols.
Then, we focused on the efficient transmission of common
information and proposed to multicast it, leveraging on the
broadcast nature of the wireless channel, as a means to
decrease the resources used by the BS, in downlink, and by the
IoT devices, for the feedback in UL. We presented a scheme
that provides updates that are timely and authenticated by
trusted sources, to a large number of IoT devices. The scheme
ensures the integrity of the information sent by the BS via
digital signatures; however, it is inevitable that the BS can
withhold valid blocks or signatures by not transmitting them.
The extension in this research direction is part of our current
work.
The numerical simulations showed how the performances of
the scheme depend on the number of IoT devices, the number
of servers that they trust, and the wireless channel quality (bit
error rate). The scheme finds straightforward application in
wireless BS, such as Wi-Fi access points. However, we have
only evaluated the parameters of Bitcoin blockchain, in which
the size of a digital signature is comparable with the one of
a block header. As this is not the case for other blockchains,
such as Ethereum, the impact of the ratio between size of
the block header and digital signature should be evaluated.
The proposed scheme can, in principle, be extended for the
transmission of large block headers or even of the full blocks,
if packet fragmentation is taken into account.
In conclusion, our work advocates for further research
in improving the connectivity of wireless IoT tailored for
blockchain applications.
APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF (5)
The transitioning from state 1 to state j happens when the
first j−1 signatures are not received, and the j-th is received.
In addition, all the j blocks should be received, to allow the
authentication chaining. We distinguish between two cases.
In the first case, j ≤ d − k + 1, each block is transmitted
exactly k times, and we write:
p1,j =(1− ps)j−1(1− pke,b)j−1ps(1− pke,b) (12)
=ps(1− ps)j−1(1− pke,b)j .
Note that, in (12), we account for j − 1 unsuccessful trans-
missions of packets containing signatures; j − 1 successful
transmissions of packets containing blocks (each repeated k
times); one successful signature transmission, and successful
transmission of the j-th block.
In the second case, j > d−k+1, we take into account that
blocks indexed d− k + 1 < i ≤ j are transmitted less than k
times, because they are recent. For instance, block with index
i = d−k+2 is transmitted k−1 times, block i = d−k+3 is
transmitted k − 2 times. The last block (j = d) is transmitted
only once. Based on these observations, we write
p1,j =(1− ps)d−k+1(1− pke,b)d−k+1· (13)(
j−1∏
i=d−k+2
(1− ps)(1− pd−i+1e,b )
)
· (14)
ps(1− pd−j+1e,b ), (15)
where (13) takes into account that the first d−k+1 blocks are
transmitted k times, (15) that the j-th block is the only one
whose signature is successfully transmitted (with probability
ps). Finally, (14) takes into account the intermediate blocks
that are transmitted less than k times. The equation can be
re-arranged as:
p1,j = ps(1− ps)j−1(1− pke,b)d−k+1
j∏
i=d−k+2
(1− pd−i+1e,b ).
The two cases correspond to those of (5).
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